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Abstract 
Following the literature on the comparative advantage of small versus large 
banks at lending to small businesses, and in light of the worldwide decline in the 
number of intermediaries that specialize in this type of lending associated with 
deregulation in the banking industry, we examine the role that specific categories 
of banks have played in the context of Italy’s regional economic growth. Over 
the estimation period, 1970-1993,  which ends in the year of full implementation 
of the banking reform that introduced statutory de-specialization and branching 
liberalization, Italy featured not only a substantial presence of SME’s in the real 
sector, as is still the case,  but also a large and heterogeneous set of credit 
institutions with different ownership, size and lending styles. Exploiting these 
peculiarities we study the role of specific intermediaries and gather indirect 
evidence concerning the likely effects, ceteris paribus, of the current consolidation 
processes. The main findings, stemming from panel regressions with fixed 
effects, are as follows. The overall size of the financial sector has a weak impact 
on growth, but some intermediaries are better than others: Co-operative banks 
and Special credit institutions play a positive role,  Banks of national interest 
(basically large private banks) and Public law banks (government-owned banks) 
either do not affect growth  or have a negative influence depending on how 
growth is measured. Co-operative banks were mostly small banks and Special 
credit institutions were all but large conglomerates with standardized credit 
policies, hence our results lend support to the current world-wide concerns of a 
reduction in the availability of credit to SME’s resulting from consolidation and 
regulatory reforms in the banking industry. 
  






There are two distinct streams of literature related to our application. 
The first is the large body of work on financial structure and economic 
development originated by Goldsmith (1969), its follow-up within the 
endogenous growth literature (see the surveys by Pagano, 1993, and 
Levine, 1997, 2003). The second is a relatively smaller and scattered set 
of contributions which investigate the relationship between various 
dimensions of the banking firm (e.g. ownership, as in La Porta et. al., 
2002, or organisational structure, as in Berger and Udell, 2002) and its 
lending behaviour.  
As it is well known, Goldsmith (1969) provided considerable 
evidence on the positive correlation between indicators of financial 
development and the level of economic activity, but due to data 
limitations and insufficient theoretical underpinning, was unable to lay 
bare causal links and growth effects. This task has been carried out by 
many scholars within the endogenous growth research programme, by 
stressing the role of financial intermediaries in a world of imperfect 
information1.  
In an influential paper by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), for 
instance, trading arrangements are costly to establish and technological 
shocks have two components -aggregate and project specific- which 
cannot be observed separately. Organisational structures, like financial 
intermediaries, arise endogenously to facilitate trade in the economy: 
“[T]hrough a research type process, intermediaries collect and analyse 
information that allows investors’ resources to flow to their most 
profitable uses. By investing through an intermediary, individuals gain 
access, so to speak, to a wealth of experience of others” (p. 2). Thanks to 
their large portfolios intermediaries can infer the aggregate productivity 
shock and select the best technology relative to the current realisation of 
the shock. Furthermore, by performing their traditional risk pooling 
activities, they are able to offer individuals both a higher and safer return. 
As the economy grows it becomes possible to implement costly financial 
structures, which in turn promote growth by allowing a higher rate of 
return to be earned on capital.  
Bencivenga and Smith (1991), instead, derive new links from the 
basics of banking, i.e. borrowing from and lending to large numbers of 
agents, holding liquid reserves against withdrawal, matching maturities 
and reducing the need for self-financing. By providing these services 
optimally, the banking industry reduces the fraction of savings that 
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society has to hold in the form of unproductive liquid assets and 
increases the rate of capital accumulation. If growth is modelled as an 
endogenous process, this is going to affect positively the rate of 
economic growth. 
A direct mechanism was suggested by King and Levine (1993a, 
1993b), who restated in a modern general equilibrium framework 
Schumpeter’s idea that profit-seeking innovators are the main actors of 
economic growth. Accordingly, financial institutions stimulate growth by 
sorting and funding innovative entrepreneurial activities, i.e. by 
accelerating the pace of technological change2.  
These new insights have produced a large empirical literature. We 
provide a short account of these applications in the next section. It is 
worth stressing, however, that although most findings are broadly 
consistent with the prediction that countries with better-developed 
financial systems grow faster, they are still controversial and, what’s 
more, provide little guidance to policymakers. As pointed out recently by 
Zingales (2003), there are at least six weak links in the quest for a reliable 
relation between finance and growth3. Our attempt here addresses 
directly one of these, namely the limitations of measures of financial 
development, and has the ambition of providing some clue to 
policymakers for evaluating the present-day consolidation. 
The second stream of literature relevant for our work focuses on two 
closely related aspects: the interaction between lending styles and the 
organisational structure of the banking firm; the influence of ownership 
on bank behaviour.  
Following Berger and Udell (2002) lending can be categorised into 
four different technologies: financial statement lending, asset-based 
lending, credit scoring and relationship lending. The first three 
technologies, also known as transaction based lending, require as input 
“’hard’ information that is relatively easily available at the time of loan 
origination  and does not rely on ‘soft’ data gathered over the course of a 
relationship with the borrower”4 (p. 36). On the contrary, under 
relationship lending “the lender bases its decisions in substantial part on 
proprietary information about the firm and its owner gathered through a 
variety of contacts over time” (p. 37). A pivotal role within relationship 
lending is played by the loan officer, who collects and provides to the 
bank soft, hard to quantify information concerning the firm, its owner 
and the local community. Clearly, this type of lending is worthwhile with 
informationally opaque customers, like many small businesses. In any 
event, in order to offer relationship lending, greater authority must be 
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delegated to the loan officer, with the twofold consequence of worsening 
agency problems between the officer and the bank and creating the need 
for an organisational structure capable of coping with them.  
Viewing bank lending as the outcome of a hierarchy of contracting 
problems in which the interaction between the loan officer and the small 
business borrowers is just the first layer of contracting5, Berger and Udell 
(2002) show that small organisations may do better than large 
organisations in activities based on soft information. Several studies 
confirm this prediction (see, in addition to the works referred to in the 
paper, Berger et. al. 2002 and Cole et. al. 2004), hence we should expect 
larger institutions to be less likely to make relationship loans.  
As to the influence of ownership on bank behaviour, two recent 
works need consideration here. La Porta et. al. (2002) investigate the 
consequences for economic and financial development of government 
ownership of banks according to two different perspectives, the 
“development” view and the “political” view6. The former places 
government ownership of banks within a broader plan for reaching 
social objectives through government control of strategic economic 
sectors. The latter emphasizes political objectives, i.e. the provision 
through the control of enterprises (including banks) of employment, 
subsidies and other benefits in exchange for votes and political support. 
Both views imply greater pervasiveness of government ownership in 
poorer countries or, more generally, countries with less well functioning 
institutions. However, ceteris paribus, the development view imply that 
government ownership of banks should benefit subsequent economic 
development, whereas the political view imply a detrimental effect due to 
crowding out of private firms. The empirical findings, using data from 92 
countries around the world, support some elements of the development 
view but are overall more favourable to the political view (p. 267). 
 Much in the same vein, Paola Sapienza (2002) considers three main 
views of state-owned enterprises (social, agency and political) and tests 
their validity by looking at the differences in the credit policies of both 
privately owned and state-owned banks. The analysis, based on a unique 
dataset on over 37,000 Italian firms, examines the interest rate charged to 
similar companies (in terms of risk profile) by the two types of banks. 
Overall, the results are supportive of the political view and suggest that 
“state-owned banks serve as a mechanism to supply political patronage” 
with “distorting effects on the financial allocations of resources” (p. 3).  
In light of these intuitions it is evident that a large body of the current 
empirical research on finance and growth, based on aggregate cross-
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country measures, is neglecting an important trait of the financial 
structure. Our contribution exploits the peculiarities of the Italian 
context before the unification of the European financial market to fill 
this gap. Using a panel approach we find that, irrespective of ownership, 
large banks are, if anything, negatively correlated with growth, whereas 
Co-operative banks and Special credit institutions do have a positive 
influence.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section 
selectively discusses recent empirical work on finance and growth. 
Section 3 documents the importance of SME’s for economic 
performance across the main world economies and their dependence on 
external finance provided by banks. Section 4 describes the Italian 
context over the estimation period. Section 5 presents the methodology 
and the main empirical findings. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Empirical research on finance and growth 
The growing body of empirical research on financial development and 
economic growth has employed several econometric techniques, ranging 
from pure cross-country regressions to microeconomic studies based on 
the natural experiment approach. Here we limit the discussion to four 
empirical investigations which have direct bearings with our study.  
 King and Levine (1993a,b) explores the linkages between finance and 
growth using data on 80 countries from 1960 through 1989. They start 
with a “base” regression in which the growth rate of real per capita GDP 
depends on the logarithm of initial income, the logarithm of the initial 
secondary school enrolment rate, and four indicators of the level of 
financial sector development. These are intended to capture, respectively, 
the overall size of the formal financial intermediary sector, the incidence 
of those financial intermediaries which are more likely to provide the 
services suggested by the theory, the extent to which total credit is 
allocated to the private sector and the weight of this monetary aggregate 
relative to GDP.7 The cross-country evidence indicates a strong link 
between financial indicators and long run growth. This result survives a 
number of sensitivity checks, which include altering the conditioning set 
of information, using different subperiods of time and subsamples of 
countries. To overcome endogeneity problems, the authors also examine 
the relationship between the values of the financial indicators at the start 
of the period and subsequent economic growth (King and Levine, 
1993a); in addition, using instrumental variable methods, they evaluate 
whether the predictable component of financial indicators are 
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significantly related to growth (King and Levine, 1993b). Both 
extensions of the analysis support the original finding that financial 
indicators tend to be strongly associated with economic growth.  
 Along similar lines, De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) include in the 
basic specification of Barro (1991) a measure of financial development, 
termed CREDIT, which corresponds to domestic credit to the private 
sector as a fraction of GDP. The reason why other candidate indicators 
are discarded is that one can easily envisage situations in which they 
reflect financial underdevelopment rather than development8.They find 
that per capita real output growth is positively and significantly 
correlated with their preferred indicator of financial development, while 
the remaining parameter estimates conform to previous works. This 
result does not change if in the regression the average value of the 
variable CREDIT over the estimation period is replaced by the same 
variable measured at the beginning of the period (so as to circumvent 
endogeneity problems). To explore the robustness of this result across 
different stages of development, they also run the same regressions 
across subsamples of countries, and find that CREDIT has an increasing 
impact on growth as one moves from high-income to low-income 
countries. Finally, they concentrate on the Latin American countries and 
carry out estimations of the basic specification using panel data (pooled 
cross-section averaged over six years period) with random effects. 
Surprisingly, the impact of CREDIT is significantly negative, despite the 
remaining parameters stand in line with earlier results. The suggested 
interpretation of this finding is that “it may reflect the effects of 
experiments of extreme liberalisation of financial markets followed by 
their subsequent collapse” (De Gregorio and Guidotti, p. 443).  
 From a different perspective, Samolyk (1994) examines the empirical 
relationship between banking conditions and regional economic growth 
using state-level data for the US economy between 1983 and 1990. The 
hypothesis, here, is that “the health of the regional financial sector (in 
terms of the credit quality of local banks and nonbanks borrowers) can 
influence investment activity and regional economic growth by affecting 
a region’s ability to fund local projects” (Samolyk, 1994, p. 261). Thus, in 
the basic empirical model, the relative state personal income growth is 
regressed on its lagged values and a set of variables representing different 
aspects of local credit conditions (like, for instance, the bank return on 
assets (ROA) and the share of nonperforming loans). The results from 
panel estimation are broadly consistent with the credit view hypothesis. 
Further evidence in favour of the hypothesis is found by splitting the 
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sample, via interactive dummy variables, into low and high lagged-
income-growth groups, and testing whether there is a different 
association between credit conditions and output.  
 Finally, we ought to mention two closely related papers by Levine, 
Loayza and Beck (2000) and Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) which use 
panel techniques to study the relationship between financial intermediary 
development and, respectively, growth and the sources of growth (i.e. 
productivity of growth and physical capital accumulation). The measures 
of financial intermediaries development included in the regressions are 
LIQUID LIABILITIES (currency plus demand and interest-bearing 
liabilities of banks and non banks financial institutions), 
COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL BANK (commercial bank assets relative to 
commercial bank plus central bank assets) and PRIVATE CREDIT 
(credit issued by banks and other financial intermediary to the private 
sector divided by GDP). These are meant to capture, respectively, 
financial depth, the extent to which society’s savings are allocated by 
private banks, and the size and quality of financial sector. To assess 
robustness, various conditioning information sets are used. The overall 
results indicate a positive relationship between the exogenous 
component of financial development and both growth and the sources 
of growth.  
More recent investigations, in particular the massive effort carried out 
at the World Bank by a number of researchers (see Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine, 2001) working on a unique dataset on financial systems around 
the world, have taken advantage of the quantity and quality of indicators 
of financial structure now available in order to test for the influence of 
both banks and stock markets. The indicators of financial institutions 
used are richer than in earlier studies and not only distinguish among 
central banks, deposit money banks and other financial institutions 
(institutions that serve as financial intermediaries while not incurring 
liabilities usable as means of payments) but also reflect activity and 
efficiency of intermediaries. Due to their cross-country nature, however,  
they are only able to capture the role of broad categories of 
intermediaries (central banks, private banks, others).  
 In what follows we exploit the characteristics of our regional dataset 
to address basically the same questions of the above investigations. We 
adopt a full panel approach that allow for both economy-wide fixed 
effects by year and region-specific fixed effects that might reflect 
persistent differences across regions, such as initial conditions and 
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cultural differences. Unlike previous studies, we are able to introduce a 
meaningful institutional breakdown among banking intermediaries.  
3. Small businesses and small business credit 
The importance of small businesses across the main world economies 
can be immediately appreciated by looking at Table 1, which depicts the 
size class structure and share of employment for non-primary sector 
private enterprises in Europe-199, USA and Japan. The vast majority of 
enterprises are SMEs, with LSEs accounting for only 0,25% of all 
enterprises. In Europe and Japan, SMEs provide a job for about two 
thirds of the occupied persons, whereas in the U.S., where many micro 
enterprises are sole proprietors, the employment shares of SMEs and 
LSEs are pretty close. 
 
 
Looking at the role of SMEs in Europe-19 through the indicators 
presented in Table 2, it can be seen that SMEs export a lower share of 
turnover and create a lower value added per occupied person than do 




Tab. 1 – Private Enterprises  in USA, Japan and Europe-19 
      
 SME LSE 
 Micro Small M-sized Total  
Enterprises   
USA, 2000 94 5 1 100 0 
Japan, 2001 n/a n/a n/a 100 0 
Europe-19, 2003 92 7 1 100 0 
Employment   
USA, 2000 22 15 12 49 51 
Japan, 2001 n/a n/a n/a 67 33 
Europe-19, 2003 39 17 13 70 30 
Source: Estimated by EIM Business & Policy Research – Observatory of European 
SMEs, 2003/7. Micro: less than 10 occupied persons; Small: between 10 and 50 
occupied persons; Medium-sized enterprises: between 50 and 250 occupied 
persons; LSE: 250 or more occupied persons. 
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As suggested in the Observatory Report (2003b, p. 26), the export 
performance indicates that most small enterprises serve only limited local 
and regional markets. The productivity gap instead can be influenced by 
the distribution of enterprises across different sectors and by industry 
structure. Indeed, when adjustments for differences in industry structure 
are made “a rather different picture emerges, as the differences between 
small, medium-sized and large enterprises to a large extent disappear; 
only micro enterprises still lag behind with respect to value added per 
occupied persons” (p. 26). This latter size-class dominates in 10 
countries and reaches its lowest ratio of occupied person per enterprises 
in Greece and Italy (2 and 4 respectively). Similar patterns can be 
observed in the Acceding and Candidate Countries (ACC), but within 
this group large differences exist between the Central and Eastern 
European Countries and the Mediterranean Countries. The former tend 
to have a larger enterprise size than the average of ACC and Europe-19; 
the latter seem to conform to the structure of Southern EU countries (p. 
33). 
 Turning now to the relationship between SMEs and banks, it is worth 
stressing that the study of enterprises access to finance, unlike 
demographic studies, has to rely on a wider and diverse range of sources. 
Some basic facts, however, can be inferred from the BACH (Bank for 
the Accounts of Companies Harmonised) database of the European 
Commission and the ENSR Enterprise Survey 2002 (see Observatory 
Report, 2003a). First, there is no clear link between the equity ratio 
(equity as a percentage of total capital) and firm size, i.e. in some 
countries the ratio of small enterprises is higher than in medium-sized 
enterprises, and vice versa (Observatory Report, 2003a, p. 20)10. Second, 
despite the presence of both bank-based financial systems (Germany, 
Tab. 2 – Basic features of SME and LSE in Europe 19, 2003
        
  SME LSE TOTAL 
  Micro Small M-sized Total   
Number of enterprises  (,000) 17820 1260 180 19270 40 19310 
Employment  (,000) 55040 24280 18100 97420 42300 139710 
Occupied person per enterprise  3 19 98 5 1052 7 
Turnover/n. of enterprises (,000€) 440 3610 25680 890 319020 1550 
Value added/n. of enterprises (,000€) 120 1180 8860 280 126030 540 
Exports/turnover (%) 9 13 17 12 23 17 
Value added/occupied persons (,000€) 40 60 90 55 120 75 
Labour costs/value added (%) 57 57 55 56 47 52 




Austria, Italy) and market-based financial systems (United Kingdom), the 
majority of European SMEs depend on bank financing and rely more 
than large firms on this source of capital. Estimates provided by the 
Group of Ten (2001) and partly based on BACH, concerning a subset of 
EU countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Netherlands) plus 
Canada, Japan and the U.S., indicate an average share of bank debt to 
total debt for small enterprises of about 54% for EU countries, 53% for 
Canada, 28% for Japan and 41% for the U.S. The average share of large 
firms, not available for Canada and U.S., is obviously smaller but still 
remarkable, equalling 33% both in Europe and Japan.11  
More insights into the importance of bank financing for SMEs can be 
gained from the ENSR Enterprise Survey (see Observatory Report, p.22-
23). The majority of SMEs that have credit lines with banks interacts 
with just one bank, and the credit amount is relatively small (less than 
100,000 euro). The highest percentage of SMEs that concentrate all their 
credit lines in one bank is found in Denmark (90%) and Norway (80%), 
whereas in several southern European countries the percentage is 
smaller. Indeed, according to our calculations based on the Survey of 
Manufacturing Firms (SMF) by Mediocredito Centrale,12  Italian firms 





Tab. 3 – Relationships between enterprises and banks in Italy
 
Turnover (million of euros) 
Whole sample Below 5 From 5 to 50 
Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean 
 
Number of banks 4445 6 2380 4.5 1687 8.0 
Share of first bank on debt 3300 38% 1755 42.27% 1261 34.2% 
First bank is in province 4339 65.1% 2335 68.5% 1641 62.2% 
Years of relationship with first 
bank 
4279 16 2300 15.0 1622 17.4 
Need more credit 4440 13.7% 2374 15.5% 1685 12.6% 
Wish to pay higher interest 
rate 
4437 5.0% 2370 5.6% 1686 4.9% 
Applied for credit but it has 
been denied 
4440 3.6% 2373 4.0% 1685 3.2% 
Firms employing innovative 
financial instruments 
4487 3.8% 2395 2.2% 1706 5.3% 




For the vast majority of firms the first bank in the pool is located in the 
province and the relationship between the firm and the first bank lasts 
on average more than 15 years. Also, the share of the first bank on debt 
ranges from 42% to 34%.  
Differences in the relationship between banks and enterprises by 
country might be explained by a host of factors (e.g. tax system, financial 
system, legal framework, business culture) which cannot be studied 
further here. It is apparent however that SMEs depend on banks and 
that such dependence,  though not expected to change dramatically in 
the near future, might nevertheless evolve in tandem with the 
transformations of the banking industry. Today, regulatory reforms and 
consolidation of financial institutions are the overriding features of the 
world financial landscape. Both phenomena may result in restricted 
























Source: European Association of Co-operative Banks, Activity Report, 2000-2002 
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credit availability to SMEs due to the decline in the number of 
intermediaries that traditionally specialise in small business lending. As 
shown in Figure 1, the latter still have significant market shares in many 
European countries13. 
Before the completion of the EU, Italy featured a variety of banking 
institutions, its stock market was rather modest and the economic 
growth of its regions was driven by SMEs. Which bank type, if any, had 
a positive impact? 
4.  Italy’s credit markets 
Some characteristics of Italy are well-known: the leading role of SMEs in 
promoting growth, the uneven pattern of regional economic 
development, the persistence of the North-South divide. Others, like the 
presence of over 1,000 banks scattered throughout the country, the 
segmentation of the banking markets along regional lines, and the 
heterogeneity of intermediaries -by size, ownership and range of services 
supplied- are less well-known. The role of national and regional financial 
institutions has been a recurring issue in both the political and academic 
debate and has prompted a large literature. In this section we limit the 
presentation to the salient features of the banking system with an eye to 
the subsequent empirical analysis.  
 Despite the important transformations that took place in the 1980’s -
mostly associated with the construction of the European economic and 
monetary union- and that culminated in the 1993 “Testo Unico in 
materia bancaria e creditizia”14, until recently the Italian banking system 
was regulated by the 1936 “Legge Bancaria”. This act, adopted soon after 
the financial crisis of the 1930’s, achieved three important goals: (i) it 
gave the Bank of Italy the status and functions of Central Bank, (ii) it 
created a government body for the supervision of the banking system, 
with wide discretionary powers that in 1947 were transferred to the Bank 
of Italy, (iii) it established the two basic classes of banking intermediaries 
that could operate in the country, i.e. “Aziende di credito” (or simply 
banks) and “Istituti di credito speciale” (special credit institutions). The 
former were allowed to carry out all standard banking operations and to 
provide only short-term (up to eighteen months) credit. The latter could 
provide medium- and long term credit but could not issue short term 
liabilities15. As of December 1990 assets and loans by banks amounted 
respectively to 76.8% and 63.2% of the total. Therefore banks play a 
prominent role in the intermediation industry and, given the thinness of 
the stock market, in the whole financial system16.  
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Table 4 summarises information on the number of banks in the various 
categories and their market shares at the end of 1990. Contrasting this 
data with those of any major Western country, one might get the 
impression of a somewhat overbanked and underbranched 
configuration. As a matter of fact, this was truly the case before the 
recent wave of reforms: supervision authorities would systematically put 
stability before competition and both government interferences in the 
management of major banks and obsolete legislation would reduce 
incentives for mergers and acquisition among intermediaries. Indeed, the 
modernisation process prompted by the Bank of Italy in the 1980’s was 
triggered by the urge to boost the capital structure of banks, especially of 
the State-owned ones, and to foster their entrepreneurial nature relative 
to European rivals. 
 
table 4. Credit banks in Italy (1990)
Banks Branches Total Domestic Domestic
assets (%) customer customer
 loans (%) deposits (%)
Public law banks 6 2449 20.1 19.4 19.2
Banks of national interest 3 1459 14.4 14.0 10.6
Ordinary credit banks 106 3981 23.2 25.6 23.9
Cooperative banks 108 3290 15.0 15.3 17.2
Savings banks 75 4498 24.4 23.7 28.4
Rural and craftsmen's banks 715 1792 0.4 0.4 0.6
Central credit institutions 5 5 2.5 1.1 0.1
Total 1018 17474 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Bank of Italy  
 
 
For a long time these different categories of intermediaries have played 
quite distinct roles. Some of them, in particular, have revealed a strong 
propensity to long-term lending relationships with small businesses 
within the local markets. This is certainly the case for the “Cooperative 
banks” (CB) and the “Rural and craftsmen’s banks” (RCB), which have 
pursued consistently these goals across time and space17. Today some of 
these banks rank among the largest Italian banks, but they are generally 
smaller banks and “their geographical competence is still largely 
restricted to the regions of origin (although nowadays, this is not caused 
by regulation constraints)”(Commission of the European Communities, 1993, 
p. 151). It is unclear whether they will survive the ongoing process of 
financial liberalisation. For our purposes, however, what matters is their 
historical role of credit providers for information-intensive borrowers, 
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i.e. of good empirical counterpart for the kind of intermediary 
specialising in relationship lending. 
 To complete this outline of the Italian financial context we ought to 
mention two more things, namely the financial backwardness of 
Southern regions and the segmentation of banking markets along 
regional lines.  
 As to the first question, that was hotly debated and that received a 
prominent part in the 1988 Annual Report of the Bank of Italy, there is no 
doubt that a financial issue existed (and still exists) in Southern regions: 
“with respect to the rest of the country there are important differences 
regarding both the thinness and the competitiveness of markets, the 
efficiency of intermediaries, the cost and quality of credit provided" 
(Galli and Onado, 1990, p. 2). However, this financial backwardness of 
Southern regions might reflect both qualitative differences in the 
behaviour of customers and  inefficiencies by banks. 
 Over the sample period, households in the South held around 17% of 
their savings at the Post Office18, despite the fact that returns and 
services were often dominated by those attached to bank deposits. On 
the contrary, in the North only 7% of household savings were held at the 
Post Office, and a significant fraction was invested in treasury bills 
(BOT, CCT, BPT). Firms in the South would not exploit the array of 
financial instruments alternative to standard loans, even classical financial 
instruments such as leasing and factoring. They depended heavily on 
bank loans, especially of government subsidised loans. 
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table 5. Credit market structural indicators
GDP per branch Branches per capita Employee per branch
(millions of lire) (10,000 inhab.)
North
70-72 47.97 2.38
82-84 58.86 2.69 49.67
90-92 48.92 4.03 51.50
South
70-72 53.87 1.34
82-84 63.34 1.51 24.58
90-92 52.43 2.21 26.29
North/South
70-72 0.89 1.78
82-84 0.93 1.78 2.02
90-92 0.93 1.83 1.96
Source: Authors' calculations on Bank of Italy data  
 
 
table 6. Regional concentration index (top five banks loans over total loans)
83-85 92-94 var % 83-94
Piemonte-Val D'Aosta 0.52 0.53 1.9
Lombardia 0.31 0.32 3.2
Trentino Alto Adige 0.47 0.43 -8.5
Veneto 0.47 0.43 -8.5
Friuli Venezia Giulia 0.49 0.40 -18.4
Liguria 0.55 0.50 -9.1
Emilia Romagna 0.37 0.38 2.7
Toscana 0.61 0.50 -18.0
Umbria 0.62 0.53 -14.5
Marche 0.51 0.42 -17.6
Lazio 0.48 0.53 10.4
Abruzzi 0.61 0.45 -26.2
Molise 0.95 0.75 -21.1
Campania 0.53 0.56 5.7
Puglia 0.44 0.42 -4.5
Basilicata 0.80 0.78 -2.5
Calabria 0.79 0.72 -8.9
Sicilia 0.64 0.60 -6.3
Sardegna 0.85 0.82 -3.5
Source: Authors' calculations on Bank of Italy data  
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Tables 5 to 7 below provide a number of indicators of the spatial 
features of the banking market. The structural and dimensional measures 
reported in Table 5 show that while the ratio of GDP to branches is 
rather steady and very close to one (it was 0.89 in the seventies and it has 
been equal to 0.93 since the eighties), the number of branches for 10,000 
of the population in the North is twice as much as in the South. 
Moreover, despite the increase of this index both in the North and in the 
South19, the gap between the two macro-regions, instead of decreasing, 
has slightly widened. As for the level of competition,  Table 6 shows the 
concentration ratio (top five banks loans to total loans) by regions (there 
are 19 regions because data about Valle d’Aosta and Piemonte are not 
separately available) in the early 1980’s and 1990’s. This index has many 
limitations20, nonetheless it provides a clear idea of the degree of 
oligopoly at the regional level over the sample period. The concentration 
index is higher in the South than in the North and, with the exception of 
Abruzzo and Puglia, suggests tight oligopoly in the former area and of 
loose oligopoly in the latter. Over the period the levels of concentration 
have generally decreased (Lazio being the only case of serious increase in 
the concentration ratio, from 0.48 in the early eighties to 0.53 in the 
nineties), as a result both the gap between the two macro-areas and the 
interregional variability of the indicator have slightly declined, but 
substantial differences still existed at the end of the period, with the 
concentration index equalling 0.35 in Lombardia and 0.82 in Sardinia. 
 
table 7. Credit market efficiency in Italy
loans/deposits loans per employee loans and deposits value added value added
(millions of lire) per employee per branch per employee
(millions of lire) (millions of lire) (millions of lire)
North
70-72 0.65
82-84 0.55 1200.37 3898.39 268.82 14.61
90-92 0.80 1829.78 4978.93 254.88 19.92
South
70-72 0.62
82-84 0.44 816.93 3254.25 182.61 11.24
90-92 0.61 1233.24 4053.29 187.09 15.66
North/South
70-72 1.06
82-84 1.26 1.47 1.20 1.47 1.30
90-92 1.33 1.48 1.23 1.36 1.27
Source: Authors' calculations on Bank of Italy data  
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 Finally, let us examine the efficiency measures for the two macro-
regions in selected sub-periods since 1970 (Table 7). Again, value added 
per branch or per employee is much higher in the North than in the 
South. The two additional rough measures of market efficiency (or 
labour productivity) considered, i.e. the ratio of deposits plus loans, and 
loans alone, on the number of employees, increase overtime, but the 
regional gap tends to widen, rising worries about the effects of the 
deregulation process. Similarly, the loan to deposit ratio, which was 
almost the same in the two macro-regions in the 1970’s, becomes 30% 
higher in the North than in the South towards the end of the period. 
 Additional insights on the credit market conditions of the two areas 
can be gained by looking at the interest rate differential. The interest rate 
in the Mezzogiorno is constantly a few points above the interest rate in 
the North. Although a substantial part of the observed gap is accounted 
for by differences in risk conditions21, extensive research on this issue 
has made clear that a significant part can also be attributed to other 
factors, mostly related to lack of competition among banks22. 
 In the post-sample decade Italy’s financial market has changed 
significantly. The stock market has grown larger and so has the number 
of listed companies. The banking industry has seen the privatisation of 
former government-owned banks (though this has happened fully in the 
juridical for rather than in the governance of institutions), and a massive 
process of mergers and acquisition has taken place.  
 
 
Table 8 – Italian banking system merger and acquisition activity  (1993-2002) 
   Merger and acquisition Majority acquisition 




year  BCC  BCC  BCC   
1993 1.029 667 38 25 0.63 0.05 6 1.50 
1994 994 643 42 25 1.59 0.05 10 1.90 
1995 970 619 47 28 1.57 0.10 19 4.50 
1996 937 591 37 25 0.47 0.05 19 1.08 
1997 935 583 24 12 0.80 0.05 18 3.42 
1998 921 562 27 18 2.65 0.08 23 11.02 
1999 876 531 36 23 0.39 0.06 28 14.35 
2000 841 499 33 22 1.50 0.09 24 4.86 
2001 830 474 31 21 0.08 0.06 9 1.55 
2002 814 461 18 16 0.06 0.05 11 4.94 
Total   333 215 9.67 167 36.79 
*At the end of the year before the deal and relative to total assets of the system 
Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Report for the year 2002 
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This activity (see Table 8) has involved a large number of Co-operative 
Credit Banks. It goes without saying that this doesn’t necessarily imply a 
worsening of credit opportunities for SMEs, but due to the strong ties of 
BCC with small business it is certainly a matter of concern that calls for 
careful investigations.   
5. Empirical analysis 
5.1. Market segmentation 
 The study of economic growth using regional-level data makes sense 
only if local markets are not fully integrated. So, as a preliminary, we 
tested for market segmentation. Instead of the standard inspection of the 
interest rate differentials between locations, which can exist and persist 
simply because of higher risk, uncertainty and transaction cost, we 
applied a straightforward test -widely used by economic historians to 
study the integration of capital markets (Odell, 1989)- which focuses on 
the time profile of interest rates across different geographical areas. For, 
in integrated markets, marginal movements in the interest rates of 
different regions should be alike. Accordingly, we estimate the following 
equation 
log ri = a + b log rj 
where ri and rj are the interest rates in region i and j respectively. Basically 
this specification relates the demand and supply in two different markets, 
captured by the corresponding interest rates:”[I]n a world of perfectly 
integrated markets, equal transaction costs, uncertainty and risk premia, 
and speedy transmission of local shocks, the constant term a would equal 
zero (no interest differential) and the coefficient b would equal one 
(movements in the hinterland rate would not differ significantly from 
movements in the centre rate)“ (Odell, 1989, p. 304). 
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 We run the above regression using every possible combination of 2 
regions. The results for the intercepts and the slopes, with benchmark 
regions listed by columns23, are reported in Table X. As the data 
reported in these tables indicate, the intercepts of Southern regions with 
respect to Northern regions as benchmarks are always much greater than 
zero (only in 5 cases out of 96 the constant is not significantly different 
from zero); whereas the corresponding slopes are all less than unity (only 
in 13 cases out of 96 we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient 
is equal one). The regression evidence, therefore, indicates the existence 
of significant fixed interregional price gaps, related to regional capital 
market peculiarities, such as different operating costs and/or disparities 
in risk levels. Moreover, marginal movements in the interest rates do not 
generally correspond (estimated slopes are different from one), indicating 
that capital mobility between regions is far from perfect. 
 Instances of integration can be found only within the two macro-
areas. Furthermore, if integration is measured against the two central 
financial locations of Rome and Milan (proxied, respectively, by the 
interest rates of Lazio and Lombardia), then most regional markets 
appears to be isolated, confirming the idea of an imperfectly integrated 
national capital market. 
 These findings are consistent with the historical evidence indicating 
the existence of a dualistic financial structure, with weak price linkages 
between local and central financial districts, and significant instances of 
integration only between regions belonging to the same macro-area. 
They also imply that Italy can be an interesting country in which to study 
the interplay between finance and growth., provided that spillover effects 
among neighbouring regions within the two macro-areas are controlled 
for in the empirical analysis. 
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Table 9. Integration indexes (intercepts)
PIE VDA LOM TAA VEN FVG LIG EMR TOS UMB MAR LAZ ABR MOL CAM PUG BAS CAL SIC SAR
PIE 0.10 * -0.01  0.08 * 0.04 * -0.01  -0.05 * 0.01  0.03  0.01  0.03  -0.02  0.12 * 0.17 * 0.15 * 0.17 * 0.17 * 0.21 * 0.23 * 0.26 *
VDA -0.09 * -0.10 * 0.00  -0.05  -0.10 * -0.14 * -0.08 * -0.06  -0.08 * -0.07  -0.11 * 0.03  0.09 * 0.06 * 0.08 * 0.07  0.12 * 0.14 * 0.19 *
LOM 0.02  0.11 * 0.09 * 0.06 * 0.01  -0.04 * 0.03  0.05  0.03  0.04  -0.01  0.14 * 0.19 * 0.16 * 0.19 * 0.19 * 0.23 * 0.24 * 0.28 *
TAA -0.07 * 0.03  -0.09 * -0.04 * -0.08 * -0.13 * -0.07 * -0.04  -0.06  -0.05  -0.10 * 0.05  0.10 * 0.08 * 0.10 * 0.10  0.15 * 0.16 * 0.21 *
VEN -0.03  0.06 * -0.05 * 0.04 * -0.05 * -0.09 * -0.03  0.00  -0.03  -0.02  -0.06 * 0.08  0.14 * 0.11 * 0.13 * 0.13 * 0.18 * 0.19 * 0.23 *
FVG 0.01 0.11 * 0.00  0.09 * 0.05 * -0.04 * 0.02  0.04  0.02  0.04  -0.02  0.13 * 0.18 * 0.16 * 0.18 * 0.18 * 0.22 * 0.24 * 0.27 *
LIG 0.05 * 0.15 * 0.04 * 0.13 * 0.09 * 0.04 * 0.07 * 0.08 * 0.06 * 0.08  0.03  0.17 * 0.22 * 0.19 * 0.22 * 0.22 * 0.26 * 0.27 * 0.30 *
EMR 0.00  0.09 * -0.02  0.07 * 0.03  -0.01  -0.05  0.02  0.00  0.01  -0.03  0.11 * 0.17 * 0.14 * 0.16 * 0.16 * 0.20 * 0.22 * 0.26 *
TOS -0.02  0.08 * -0.03  0.06  0.02  -0.03  -0.07 * -0.01  -0.02  -0.01  -0.05 * 0.09 * 0.15 * 0.12 * 0.15 * 0.15 * 0.18 * 0.21 * 0.23 *
UMB 0.00  0.09 * -0.02  0.08 * 0.04  -0.01  -0.05  0.01  0.02  0.01  -0.03  0.11 * 0.17 * 0.14 * 0.17 * 0.16 * 0.20 * 0.22 * 0.26 *
MAR 0.02  0.11 * 0.01  0.09 * 0.05  0.01  -0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  -0.01  0.10 * 0.18 * 0.15 * 0.18 * 0.17 * 0.20 * 0.23 * 0.26 *
LAZ 0.04 0.14 * 0.02  0.11 * 0.08 * 0.02  -0.02  0.05  0.06 * 0.04  0.05  0.15 * 0.21 * 0.17 * 0.20 * 0.20 * 0.24 * 0.26 * 0.28 *
ABR -0.08  0.01  -0.09  0.00  -0.05  -0.09  -0.13 * -0.08  -0.06  -0.08  -0.10 * -0.12 * 0.09  0.05  0.08 * 0.06  0.11 * 0.14 * 0.19 *
MOL -0.16 * -0.06  -0.18 * -0.08  -0.12 * -0.17 * -0.22 * -0.15 * -0.13 * -0.14 * -0.14 * -0.18 * -0.04  -0.01  0.02  0.01  0.07  0.08  0.14 *
CAM -0.14 * -0.05  -0.16 * -0.05  -0.10 * -0.15 * -0.20 * -0.13 * -0.12 * -0.14 * -0.13 * -0.18 * -0.03  0.03  0.04  0.02  0.07 * 0.10 * 0.14 *
PUG -0.17 * -0.08 * -0.19 * -0.09 * -0.14 * -0.19 * -0.23 * -0.17 * -0.14 * -0.17 * -0.16 * -0.21 * -0.06  0.01  -0.02   -0.01  0.05  0.06 * 0.12  
BAS -0.13 * -0.05  -0.15 * -0.05  -0.10  -0.14 * -0.19 * -0.13 * -0.11  -0.13 * -0.13 * -0.17 * -0.04  0.04  0.00  0.03  0.07  0.10 * 0.15 *
CAL -0.20 * -0.10 * -0.21 * -0.11 * -0.16 * -0.21 * -0.26 * -0.20 * -0.18 * -0.20 * -0.21 * -0.24 * -0.10 * -0.01  -0.05  -0.02  -0.04   0.04  0.08  
SIC -0.23 * -0.14 * -0.25 * -0.15 * -0.19 * -0.24 * -0.29 * -0.23 * -0.20 * -0.23 * -0.23 * -0.26 * -0.12 * -0.05  -0.08 * -0.05  -0.06  -0.01   0.06  
SAR -0.24 * -0.13  -0.26 * -0.14  -0.19 * -0.26 * -0.30 * -0.23 * -0.22 * -0.23 * -0.23 * -0.28 * -0.11  -0.04  -0.08  -0.04  -0.06  -0.03  0.01  
*: significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
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Table 10. Integration indexes (slopes)
PIE VDA LOM TAA VEN FVG LIG EMR TOS UMB MAR LAZ ABR MOL CAM PUG BAS CAL SIC SAR
PIE 0.94 * 1.01  0.94 0.98  1.01  1.05 * 0.99  0.99  1.00  0.99  1.02  0.93  0.90 * 0.92 * 0.90 * 0.91 * 0.88 * 0.86 * 0.80 *
VDA 1.05  1.06  0.99 * 1.02  1.06  1.09 * 1.04  1.03  1.05  1.04  1.07  0.98  0.95  0.97  0.95 * 0.97  0.93 * 0.91 * 0.84 *
LOM 0.99  0.93 * 0.93  0.97 * 1.00  1.03 * 0.98  0.97  0.99  0.98  1.01  0.92 * 0.89 * 0.90 * 0.89 * 0.90 * 0.87 * 0.85 * 0.79 *
TAA 1.05  0.99  1.06 * 1.03 * 1.07 * 1.10 * 1.05 * 1.04  1.05  1.05  1.08 * 0.98  0.95  0.96  0.95 * 0.96  0.92 * 0.91 * 0.84 *
VEN 1.02  0.96  1.03 * 0.97 * 1.03 * 1.06 * 1.02  1.01  1.02  1.01  1.04  0.95  0.92 * 0.94 * 0.92 * 0.94  0.90 * 0.88 * 0.81 *
FVG 0.98 0.93 * 1.00  0.93 * 0.96 * 1.03 * 0.98  0.97  0.99  0.97  1.01  0.91 * 0.89 * 0.90 * 0.88 * 0.90 * 0.86 * 0.85 * 0.79 *
LIG 0.95 * 0.90 * 0.96 * 0.90 * 0.93 * 0.97 * 0.95 * 0.94 * 0.95 * 0.94  0.98  0.88 * 0.86 * 0.87 * 0.85 * 0.87 * 0.83 * 0.82 * 0.76 *
EMR 1.00  0.95 * 1.01  0.95 * 0.98  1.01  1.04  0.99  1.00  1.00  1.02  0.94  0.90 * 0.92 * 0.90 * 0.92 * 0.88 * 0.87 * 0.80 *
TOS 1.00  0.95  1.01  0.95 * 0.98  1.02  1.05  1.00  1.01  1.01  1.03  0.94  0.90 * 0.92 * 0.90 * 0.92 * 0.89 * 0.87 * 0.81 *
UMB 0.99  0.94 * 1.00  0.93  0.97  1.00  1.03  0.99  0.98  0.99  1.02  0.93 * 0.89 * 0.91 * 0.89 * 0.91 * 0.88 * 0.86 * 0.79 *
MAR 0.97  0.93 * 0.98  0.92 * 0.96  0.98  1.01  0.98  0.97  0.99   1.00  0.93 * 0.88 * 0.90 * 0.88 * 0.91 * 0.88 * 0.85 * 0.79 *
LAZ 0.97 0.91 * 0.98  0.91 * 0.95 * 0.98  1.01  0.96  0.96 * 0.97  0.96   0.90 * 0.87 * 0.89 * 0.87 * 0.89 * 0.85 * 0.83 * 0.78 *
ABR 1.03  0.99  1.04  0.98 * 1.02  1.05  1.08  1.04  1.03  1.05  1.06 * 1.07   0.94  0.96  0.94 * 0.97  0.93 * 0.91 * 0.83 *
MOL 1.08 * 1.03  1.10 * 1.03  1.06  1.10 * 1.13 * 1.08 * 1.07  1.08  1.08  1.11 * 1.02   1.00  0.98  1.00  0.95  0.94  0.86 *
CAM 1.08 * 1.03  1.09 * 1.02  1.05 * 1.09 * 1.13 * 1.07 * 1.07 * 1.09 * 1.08 * 1.11 * 1.02  0.98  0.97  1.00  0.96  0.94 * 0.87 *
PUG 1.10 * 1.05 * 1.11 * 1.04  1.08 * 1.12 * 1.15 * 1.10 * 1.09 * 1.11 * 1.10 * 1.13 * 1.04  1.00  1.02   1.02  0.98  0.96  0.88 *
BAS 1.05  1.01  1.06  1.00  1.03  1.07  1.10  1.05  1.04  1.06  1.06  1.08  1.01  0.96  0.98  0.96   0.94  0.92 * 0.84 *
CAL 1.11 * 1.06  1.12 * 1.05  1.08 * 1.12 * 1.15 * 1.11 * 1.11 * 1.12 * 1.13 * 1.14 * 1.06 * 1.00  1.03  1.00  1.03   0.97  0.90 *
SIC 1.14 * 1.09 * 1.15 * 1.08  1.12 * 1.15 * 1.19 * 1.14 * 1.12 * 1.14 * 1.14 * 1.16 * 1.07  1.03  1.05  1.03  1.05  1.01   0.92  
SAR 1.18 * 1.11  1.19 * 1.11 * 1.15 * 1.20 * 1.23 * 1.17 * 1.18 * 1.18 * 1.18 * 1.21 * 1.10  1.06 1.09  1.06  1.08 1.06  1.03  
*: significantly different from unity at the 5% level.
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5.2 Some estimation issues 
 Regional economic growth can be effectively proxied either by the 
growth rate of gross domestic product per capita or by the growth rate 
of regional value added per worker. We use both indicators for two 
reasons. First, because they are not perfect substitutes (the former is an 
imperfect measure of welfare whereas the latter is a measure of 
productivity); second, because this allows us to test for the robustness of 
results with respect to the proxy for economic growth. 
Unfortunately, both rates are likely to be affected by the national 
business cycle. Therefore, in order to focus on genuine regional growth, 
it is essential to get rid of this component. In what follows, this is 
achieved by including time fixed effects, which control for idiosyncratic 
year effects due not only to the interregional business cycle but also to 
other unobserved institutional changes through time24. 
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To begin with, we run a “base” regression featuring the level of 
economic growth in the starting period25, human capital, proxied by the 
secondary school enrolment rate, and government consumption. This 
formulation controls for the main economic phenomena which 
according to available evidence (Di Liberto, 1994) are robustly associated 
with growth and which are at work at the regional level. We extended 
this “base” conditioning set by including several measures of regional 
financial development and, in particular, of credit markets. As far as the 
aggregate level of financial intermediation is concerned, we considered 
various measures of both the banking product relative to regional GDP 
(such as deposits, loans and deposits plus loans) and its spatial coverage 
(branches per inhabitants, or per GDP, by region). All such variables 
prove weakly and unrobustly related to economic growth. Next, we 
introduce our institutional breakdown. We consider four types of 
intermediaries: Banks of National Interest, Co-operative and rural banks, 
Special Credit Institutions and Public Law Banks. As discussed in the 
previous sections, historically Co-operative banks have provided credit 
to small entrepreneurs operating within local markets, and they still play 
this role, despite the fact that some of them grew very large and have 
attracted among their clients even major industrial corporations. The 
Banks of national interest (private banks) and the Public law banks 
(government-owned banks), on the other hand, are large geographically 
diversified banks with, in few cases, a significant international presence. 
Both should be better equipped to support local economies thanks to 
more opportunities for cross-subsidisation and to economy of scale and 
scopes. Finally, the special credit institutions -that disappeared as a 
separate category after the recent banking reform- during the sample 
period were the main institutions specialised in medium and long term 
lending to private and public companies. They were not allowed to 
collect savings directly from depositors and were controlled, directly or 
indirectly, by the government. Most of public “subsidised credit” to 
private firms, in the form of interest rate reductions and capital grants, 
has been channelled through these institutions. It goes without saying 
that there are other intermediaries that play the function of screening and 
funding local projects and provide financial services capable of 
increasing the social productivity of investment. The above categories of 
banks, however, operate everywhere in the country and for a number of 
historical, economic and legal reasons mirror more closely the type of 
financial institution found in the theory26. To take account of possible 
time impacts of financial development on economic growth we estimate 
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three panel regressions: a full panel regression with one-year growth 
rates, and two other panel regressions with average growth rates of the 
dependent variable for three and five years respectively. The former 
panel includes, as a result, 420 observations, and it is meant to focus on 
the short-run impact of financial development on economic growth, 
whilst the second (consisting of 140 observations) and the third panel 
(with 80 observations) concentrate on the medium and the long-run 
impact respectively. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the equations include regional fixed 
effects and are estimated by using weighted least squares so as to control 
for heteroscedasticity across regions. Moreover, in order to avoid 
problems of simultaneity, all regressors are referred to the initial period 
(t-1, t-3 and t-5 respectively). No problem of autocorrelation in the 
residual is detected.  
 
5.3 Main findings 
 Panel regressions results for the 20 Italian regions over the 1970-1993 
period are presented in table 11 (for value added per worker) and table 
12 (for gross domestic product per capita). The aforementioned four 
indicators of financial specialisation are added to the subset of robust 
regressors from earlier studies on the determinants of growth. The first 
column, in the two tables, shows estimates from the more general 
formulation which allows one to focus on the short run relationship, 
whilst in the second and the third column one finds the estimates for the 
medium and the long run impact respectively. The parameter estimates 
of the control variables (that is, lagged dependent variable, human capital 
and government consumption) are in line with previous evidence. It is 
worth stressing that the coefficient on government consumption is 
usually positive and significant in the short run whilst it loses such 
significance and sometimes it changes sign for longer lags. This may be 
interpreted as a signal that such expenditures affect just temporarily 
regional growth and that it effects die out quite quickly. 
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table 11. Regression results
method: generalised least squares (cross section weights) with temporal and fixed effects








long run analysis 
(i=5)
value added(t-i) -0.14 -0.17 -0.13
(-6.22) a (-6.36) a (-6.67) a
human capital(t-i) 0.11 0.02 0.04
(5.28) a (1.34) (2.86) a
public consumption(t-i) 0.05 0.00 0.01
(2.18) b (0.21) (-0.61)
public banks(t-i) -0.009 -0.009 -0.01
(-1.18) (-1.63) (-1.84) c
banks of national interest(t-i) -0.016 0.004 -0.001
(-2.15) b (0.66) (-0.17)
cooperative banks(t-i) 0.004 0.004 0.001
(2.09) b (3.75) a (1.50)
special credit institutions(t-i) 0.012 0.005 0.008
(2.09) b (0.96) (-2.01) b
Adjusted R-squared 0.65 0.80 0.95
t-student in parentheses, a= significant at 1% level, b=significant at 5% level, c=significant at 10% level  
 
 
table 12. Regression results
method: generalised least squares (cross section weights) with temporal and fixed effects








long run analysis 
(i=5)
value added(t-i) -0.12 -0.44 -0.21
(-5.70) a (-3.87) a (-9.76) a
human capital(t-i) 0.11 0.13 0.07
(4.98) a (2.25) b (5.51) a
public consumption(t-i) 0.10 0.13 -0.04
(3.96) a (1.28) (-1.78) c
public banks(t-i) -0.022 -0.049 -0.004
(-3.07) a (-2.63) b (-0.78)
banks of national interest(t-i) -0.023 -0.047 -0.028
(-3.06) a (-2.17) b (-4.89) a
cooperative banks(t-i) 0.004 0.01 0.004
(2.25) b (2.20) b (5.93) a
special credit institutions(t-i) 0.011 0.011 0.005
(2.03) b (0.83) (1.92) c
Adjusted R-squared 0.68 0.75 0.96
t-student in parentheses, a= significant at 1% level, b=significant at 5% level, c=significant at 10% level  
 
 As for the role of different financial institutions, results show some 
similarities and some differences depending on the variable used to 
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proxy for economic growth. As far as the similarities are concerned, the 
most robust result refers to the Co-operative banks, which display a 
positive impact (in the short, medium and long run) on the rate of 
regional economic growth irrespective of how this is measured (gdp per 
head or value added per worker). The significance of such a positive 
coefficient is however rather unstable. This result is certainly interesting 
and confirms the finding of similar cross-sectional studies based on 
provincial data27. Special credit institutions, again, have a positive and 
significant impact in most regression28. We tend to interpret this result as 
a signal of the importance of government financial intervention to foster 
the process of structural change which has characterised public policies 
for the Mezzogiorno until the 1980’s. As for the differences, banks of 
national interest and public banks often have a negative but insignificant 
impact on value added per worker; whilst such a negative impact proves 
significant when gross domestic product per capita proxies growth. This 
is a somewhat puzzling result, as these banks are expected to be more 
efficient and highly specialised in the provision of innovative services to 
firms. We take this result as indirect evidence that their organisational 
structure has prevented them from dealing effectively with information-
intensive borrowers, particularly those small businesses that drive 
economic development in most Italian regions.  
6. Conclusions  
 Following the tradition of cross-countries studies of growth, this 
paper has examined the empirical linkages between financial 
development and economic growth in Italian regions before the 
unification of the European financial market. Taking a full panel 
approach we find that indicators of financial development are positively 
associated with economic growth. We control for unobserved region-
specific differences and unspecified interregional fluctuations and, 
relative to previous efforts in this area, we introduce a finer institutional 
breakdown. Although the overall size of the financial sector does not 
have a robust impact on growth, two types of intermediaries, Co-
operative banks and Special credit institutions, appear to play a role, 
whilst two other types of intermediaries, Banks of national interest and 
Public law banks, either do not affect growth (when measured by valued 
added per worker) or their influence is negative (when growth is 
measured by GDP per capita). Italian regional development is mostly 
driven by the performance of information-intensive SMEs, hence our 
results lend support to the idea that smaller and less complex banking 
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institutions are better equipped than large hierarchical banking 
corporations at funding these important economic actors. Since the 
ongoing process of consolidation in financial markets is producing larger 
and more complex institutions, these results raise serious worries about 
the final impact on SMEs. At the same time, the apparently inconsistent 
result concerning the role of Public law banks and Special credit 
institutions, shows that both the “political” and “development” function 
of government ownership can be simultaneously at work. After all, as 
stressed by Rodrik (2002), economic progress is everywhere the result of 
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1In this context, a potential entrepreneur who wants to rise investment capital 
for a project with substantial expected returns and who has superior 
knowledge about his business than anyone else, might not be able to raise the 
desired amount of capital because of three problems: (i) adverse selection; 
(ii) moral hazard; (iii) ex-post verifiability. In such a context, it can be shown 
(see Leland and Pyle (1977), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Diamond (1984), van 
Damme (1994)) that resorting to an intermediary that screens potential 
borrowers, evaluates their projects and ensures that money is well used, can 
be preferable to a situation of direct finance. Therefore, putting together the 
traditional functions of intermediaries, arising from maturity mismatch, with 
the newer ones, associated with imperfect information, financial institutions 
can be seen to play at least three critical roles: transformation of savings into 
investment; screening and monitoring; provision of payment services. 
 
2 It must be stressed that in many of these models the higher rates of return 
from better resource allocation due to financial development may discourage 
saving rates and, in some circumstances, decelerate growth. 
 
3These weaknesses concern the following: 1) high correlation between 
measures of financial development and measures of good government 
institutions; 2) measures of financial development often do not reflect 
effective access to finance by firms; 3) channels through which finance 
works are generally neglected;  4) role of international financial integration 
are hardly considered; 5) single-minded fous on aggregate economic growth 
(instead of, e.g., investment and total factor productivity); 6) little attention to 
what promotes financial development. 
 
4 According to the authors, the decision to lend and the term of the contract 
are primarily based on the strenght of balance sheet and income statement in 
the case of  Financial Statement Lending, on the quality of the available 
collateral under Asset-Based Lending, on the financial condition and history 
of the principal owner, in addition to financial statement ratios, when Small 
Business Credit Scoring is used.   
 
5 The remaining layers concern the sequential contracting within the bank 
between loan officer, senior management, stockholders, creditors and 
regulators.  
 
6 The authors relate the “development” perspective to the work of Alexander 
Gershenkron (1962) and the “political” view to the research of  Kornai 
(1974) and Shleifer and Vishny (1994). 
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7 These four indicators are termed, respectively, LLY, BANK, PRIVATE and 
PRIVY, and are measured as follows (see King and Levine, 1993a, pp. 720-
21): LLY = “M3” (or “M2”)/GDP; BANK = deposit money bank domestic 
assets/(deposit money bank domestic assets + central bank domestic assets); 
PRIVATE = claims on the nonfinancial private sector/(total domestic credit - 
credit to money banks); PRIVY = claims on the nonfinancial private 
sector/GDP.  
 
8This is particularly true for monetary aggregates such as M1 and M2, which 
reflect the ability of the financial system to provide liquidity services, but do 
not necessarily reflect its ability to allocate credit -a function which is more 
directly connected to investment and growth. These aspects of financial 
intermediation are not necessarily related. In particular, high level of 
monetization can be the result of lack of financial sophistication and low 
monetization may be associated with very advanced financial structures (see 
the examples discussed in De Gregorio and Guidotti, 1995, p. 438).  
 
9 Europe-19 indicates EU-15 (i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Itay, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom) plus Iceland, Norway and Swutzerland 
(incl. Liechtenstein). 
 
10Data refers to 2000. It is worth stressing that the BACH dataset 
overestimates the equity ratio of small enterprises. Indeed, in a parallel 
calculation on data from the Survey of Manufactoring Firm by Mediocredito 
Centrale, we found that  in 1997 the equity ratio of Italian small and medium-
sized firms was significantly smaller than the one from BACH, averaging 
22,9 (small) and 23,9 (medium-sized) with very tiny (around 0.15) standard 
deviations.  
 
11 Regarding medium-sized firms, our calculations for three consecutive year 
(1995-1997) from the SMF-Mediocredito Centrale show an average share of 
bank debt to total debt of 56.4%.   
 
12 The survey excludes the micro size and concentrates on a stratified sample 
of Italian firms with at least 11 and up to 500 employees plus all 
manufacturing firms with more than 500 employees. 
 
13 It goes without saying that co-operative banks are not the sole intermediary 
specialising in small business lending and that in some countries, in many 
respects, they are closer to larger diversified banks than to small local banks. 
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14 Decree 1st September 1993, n. 385. 
 
15 These limits have been gradually removed. In 1987 short-term banks have been 
allowed to provide credit up to a maximum of five years. Since 1993 the distinction 
between these two type of intermediaries has been abolished and they can carry out the 
whole range of banking operations.  
 
16 For an up-to-date picture of the Italian financial system see the special report on Italy 
in Commission of the European Communities, n. 1, 1993.  
 
17 CBs are limited liabilities companies with special partnership features (e.g. one 
shareholder one vote), whereas RCBs can be either limited or unlimited companies and, 
usually, set ceilings on the amount of credit that can be extended to non-members.  
 
18 This behaviour, however, cannot be ascribed to irrationality of Southern economic 
agents. The Post Office has a pervasive network, hence transport and other transaction 
costs may partially explain this preference. 
 
19 Since 1990 the opening of new branches has been essentially liberalized. Before then it 
was impossible to open new branches, and close old ones, without formal permission 
from the Bank of Italy, which would call banks to apply for new branches occasionally, in 
connection with the so-called “Piani Sportelli”, and would decide whether or not to 
accept their applications discretionally. The latest “call for branches” took place in 1978, 
1983 and in 1986. 
 
20 The Herfindal index would be more suitable,  but unfortunately it is not available with 
the same frequency. The correlation ratio between the two measures, however, is usually 
very high. 
 
21 In 1994, for instance, the quota of nonperforming loans in the South was 17.0, whilst it 
was just 6.1 in the North.  
 
22 See, for instance, Jappelli (1983) and Faini et al. (1992). In this latter work, based on 
microdata, it is shown that despite the cost of credit from outside banks is systematically 
and significantly lower, Southern firms accept to borrow at different rates from outside 
and inside banks. This can be interpreted as evidence of the fact that information is 
imperfect and asymmetric. In other words, in the South captive relationships between 
firms and banks are implemented thanks to the market power of the latter, and this leads 
to a widespread phenomena of rationing and potentially distorted allocation processes. 
 
23 For the sake of clarity we have not reported all the usual diagnostics (standard errors 
and R-squared). Suffice to note here that standard errors are such that the slope 
coefficient is always significantly different from zero at the 1% level and that the adjusted 
R-squared ranges between 0.91 and 0.99 and its average is 0.97. 
24 It is worth noting that this problem has been solved differently by Samolik (1993), who 
subtracted the national growth rate from the regional one in order to obtain the 
dependent variable. This method has pros and cons with respect to ours. On the one 
 35
                                                                                                                             
hand, it reduces the number of right hand side variables; on the other hand, unlike our 
method, it fails to consider additional time effects different from the business cycle. 
 
25 This corresponds to test for convergence, a problem we are not directly interested in. 
For a more detailed analysis see DiLiberto (1994) and Paci and Pigliaru (1998). 
26The bulk of the excluded categories is represented by the “Savings banks”.  
27 See Ferri and Mattesini (1995). These authors use as indicator of financial development 
the ratio of provincial income to bank branches and control for the effect of Cooperative 
banks by including in the regression the fraction of total branches held by this category. 
Neither spillover effects nor other intermediaries are considered.  
 
28 Strangely enough, the coefficient is significant for the short and the long-run 
regression but not for the medium one. 
